{"id":7672,"date":"2020-01-30T17:33:53","date_gmt":"2020-01-30T22:33:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/?p=7672"},"modified":"2020-03-25T11:54:09","modified_gmt":"2020-03-25T15:54:09","slug":"the-founders-and-impeachment-part-ii","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/the-founders-and-impeachment-part-ii\/","title":{"rendered":"The Founders and Impeachment &#8211; Part II"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>This post is a continuation of a discussion of the framers,\nthe Constitution, and the impeachment trial of President Donald J. Trump. Both\nthe House Managers arguing for impeachment and the lawyers defending the President\nagree that intent of the founders is relevant in the Senate trial. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The phrase \u201chigh Crimes and Misdemeanors\u201d is not defined in\nSection 4 of Article II of the Constitution. Accordingly, the arguments and\nlegal briefs cite to the notes of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, the\nstate ratification debates in 1788, and <em>The<\/em> <em>Federalist Papers<\/em>. In\nparticular, <em>Federalist No.<\/em> 65 is repeatedly mentioned in the briefs,\nthe House Managers\u2019 opening statements, and the Q &amp; A\u2019s before the Senate.<\/p>\n\n\n<p><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><a style=\"color: #000000;\" href=\"https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/the-founders-and-impeachment\/\"><strong>Part I<\/strong><\/a><\/span> of this post provides an overview and discusses the House Managers\u2019 Trial Brief. This post (Part II), discusses the President\u2019s Trial Brief and legal arguments. As discussed in Part I, the House Managers argue, among other things, that when drafting the Constitution, the founders intended \u201cabuse of power\u201d to be impeachable. By contrast, the President\u2019s lawyers argue that the impeachment articles brought against President Trump are \u201cstructurally deficient and can only result in acquittal.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img loading=\"lazy\" width=\"1024\" height=\"397\" src=\"https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/Senate-chambers-1024x397.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-7675\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/Senate-chambers-1024x397.png 1024w, https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/Senate-chambers-300x116.png 300w, https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/Senate-chambers-768x298.png 768w, https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/Senate-chambers.png 1174w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>While the House Managers emphasize <em>Federalist No<\/em>. 65\nand the broad and flexible meaning of the phrase \u201chigh Crimes and Misdemeanors,\u201d\nthe President\u2019s lawyers focus on the \u201creal danger\u201d of partisan impeachments recognized\nby Hamilton in <em>Federalist<\/em> No. 65. The President\u2019s brief also cites to\nJefferson\u2019s concern that impeachment is \u201cthe most formidable weapon for the\npurposes of dominant faction that ever was contrived.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Both sets of briefs ground their arguments in the drafting history of the phrase high Crimes and Misdemeanors. The President\u2019s brief places particular emphasis on Gouverneur Morris\u2019 position that \u201cfew\u201d offenses \u201cought to be impeachable,\u201d and the \u201ccases ought to be enumerated and defined.\u201d When the term \u201cmaladministration\u201d was proposed as a ground for impeachment it was rejected based on Madison\u2019s concern that \u201c[s]o vague a term\u201d would be equivalent to a tenure during the \u201cpleasure of the Senate.\u201d Citing William Blackstone\u2019s Commentaries on the Laws of England, the President argues that the framers restricted impeachment to specified offenses of \u201calready known and established law,\u201d not amorphous abuses of power.<\/p>\n\n\n<p>Click here for a link to the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.archives.gov\/founding-docs\/constitution\"><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><strong>Constitution<\/strong><\/span><\/a> in the National Archives. A copy of the impeachment clause in Article II, Section 2 is copied below.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\"><figure class=\"aligncenter is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" src=\"https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/Screen-Shot-2020-01-30-at-5.30.21-PM.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-7683\" width=\"737\" height=\"66\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/Screen-Shot-2020-01-30-at-5.30.21-PM.png 874w, https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/Screen-Shot-2020-01-30-at-5.30.21-PM-300x27.png 300w, https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/Screen-Shot-2020-01-30-at-5.30.21-PM-768x69.png 768w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 737px) 100vw, 737px\" \/><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\"><figure class=\"aligncenter is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" src=\"https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/Screen-Shot-2020-01-30-at-5.12.46-PM-1024x61.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-7677\" width=\"739\" height=\"44\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/Screen-Shot-2020-01-30-at-5.12.46-PM-1024x61.png 1024w, https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/Screen-Shot-2020-01-30-at-5.12.46-PM-300x18.png 300w, https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/Screen-Shot-2020-01-30-at-5.12.46-PM-768x46.png 768w, https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/Screen-Shot-2020-01-30-at-5.12.46-PM.png 1077w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 739px) 100vw, 739px\" \/><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center\"><em>President Trump\u2019s Trial Brief<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Among the authorities cited in the President\u2019s Trial Brief are\nAlexander Hamilton (cited 24 times); James Madison (cited 20 times); Gouverneur\nMorris (cited 6 times), James Iredell (cited 5 times); George Mason (cited 2\ntimes); Charles Pinckney (cited once) and a letter from Thomas Jefferson to\nJames Madison in 1798. The House Managers\u2019 Trial brief cites to three of <em>The\nFederalist<\/em> essays (Nos. 65, 69, and 69). The President\u2019s Trial Brief cites\nto <em>Federalist<\/em> No. 48, 49, 51, 65, and 66. <\/p>\n\n\n<p>Click here for a link to the <span style=\"color: #000000;\"><a style=\"color: #000000;\" href=\"https:\/\/assets.documentcloud.org\/documents\/6662413\/Trial-Memorandum-of-President-Donald-J-Trump.pdf\"><strong>President\u2019s Trial Brief<\/strong><\/a><\/span>, which contains an entire background section describing the \u201cText and Drafting History of the Impeachment Clause.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\"><figure class=\"aligncenter is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" src=\"https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/Screen-Shot-2020-01-30-at-5.00.14-PM.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-7674\" width=\"396\" height=\"302\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/Screen-Shot-2020-01-30-at-5.00.14-PM.png 623w, https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/Screen-Shot-2020-01-30-at-5.00.14-PM-300x229.png 300w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 396px) 100vw, 396px\" \/><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p>Copied below are selections from the President\u2019s Trial Brief:<\/p>\n\n\n<ul>\n<li>The Framers foresaw that the House might at times fall prey to tempestuous partisan tempers. Alexander Hamilton recognized that \u201cthe persecution of an intemperate or designing majority in the House of Representatives\u201d was a real danger in impeachments, and Jefferson acknowledged that impeachment provided \u201cthe most formidable weapon for the purposes of dominant faction that ever was contrived.\u201d That is why the Framers entrusted the trial of impeachments to the Senate. <span style=\"color: #000000;\"><a style=\"color: #000000;\" href=\"https:\/\/avalon.law.yale.edu\/18th_century\/fed65.asp\"><strong><em>The Federalist <\/em> 65<\/strong><\/a><\/span> (Alexander Hamilton); <span style=\"color: #000000;\"><a style=\"color: #000000;\" href=\"https:\/\/founders.archives.gov\/documents\/Madison\/01-17-02-0057\"><strong>Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison<\/strong><\/a><\/span> (Feb. 15, 1798).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>As Justice Story explained, the Framers saw the Senate as a tribunal \u201cremoved from popular power and passions . . . and from the more dangerous influence of mere party spirit,\u201d and guided by \u201ca deep responsibility to future times.\u201d Now, perhaps as never before, it is essential for the Senate to fulfill the role Hamilton envisioned for it as a \u201cguard[] against the danger of persecution, from the prevalency of a factious spirit\u201d in the House. <span style=\"color: #000000;\"><a style=\"color: #000000;\" href=\"https:\/\/avalon.law.yale.edu\/18th_century\/fed66.asp\"><strong><em>The Federalist<\/em> 66<\/strong><\/a><\/span> (Alexander Hamilton).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>On each of the two prior occasions that the House adopted articles of impeachment against a President, the Senate refused to convict on them. Indeed, the Framers wisely forewarned that the House could impeach for the wrong reasons. That is why the Constitution entrusts the Senate with the \u201csole Power to try all Impeachments.\u201d <span style=\"color: #000000;\"><a style=\"color: #000000;\" href=\"https:\/\/avalon.law.yale.edu\/18th_century\/fed65.asp\"><strong><em>The Federalist<\/em> 65<\/strong><\/a><\/span> (Alexander Hamilton); U.S. Const. art. I, \u00a7 3, cl. 6.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>House Democrats\u2019 claim that the Senate can remove a President from office for running afoul of some ill-defined conception of \u201cabuse of power\u201d finds no support in the text or history of the Impeachment Clause. As explained above, by limiting impeachment to cases of \u201cTreason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,\u201d the Framers restricted impeachment to specific offenses against \u201calready known and established law.\u201d That was a deliberate choice designed to constrain the power of impeachment. Restricting impeachment to offenses established by law provided a crucial protection for the independence of the Executive from what James Madison called the \u201cimpetuous vortex\u201d of legislative power. <span style=\"color: #000000;\"><a style=\"color: #000000;\" href=\"https:\/\/avalon.law.yale.edu\/18th_century\/fed48.asp\"><strong><em>The Federalist<\/em> 48<\/strong><\/a><\/span> (James Madison).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n<ul><li>&nbsp;As many\nconstitutional scholars have recognized, \u201cthe Framers were far more concerned\nwith protecting the presidency from the encroachments of Congress . . . than\nthey were with the potential abuse of executive power.\u201d The impeachment power\nnecessarily implicated that concern. If the power were too expansive, the\nFramers feared that the Legislative Branch may \u201chold [impeachments] as a rod\nover the Executive and by that means effectually destroy his independence.\u201d 2 <em>The\nRecords of the Federal Convention of 1787<\/em> at 66 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)\n(Charles Pinckney).<\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul><li>One key voice at the Constitutional Convention,\nGouverneur Morris, warned that, as they crafted a mechanism to make the\nPresident \u201camenable to Justice,\u201d the Framers \u201cshould take care to provide some\nmode that will not make him dependent on the Legislature.\u201d To limit the\nimpeachment power, Morris argued that only \u201cfew\u201d \u201coffences . . . ought to be\nimpeachable,\u201d and the \u201ccases ought to be enumerated &amp; defined.\u201d 2 <em>The\nRecords of the Federal Convention of 1787<\/em> at 65 and 69.<\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul><li>Indeed, the debates over the text of the\nImpeachment Clause particularly reveal the Framers\u2019 concern that ill-defined\nstandards could give free rein to Congress to utilize impeachment to undermine\nthe Executive. As explained above, when \u201cmaladministration\u201d was proposed as a\nground for impeachment, it was rejected based on Madison\u2019s concern that \u201c[s]o\nvague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during [the] pleasure of the\nSenate.\u201d 2 Records of the Federal Convention at 550.<\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<ul><li>Madison rightly feared that a nebulous standard\ncould allow Congress to use impeachment against a President based merely on\npolicy differences, making it function like a parliamentary no-confidence vote.\nThat would cripple the independent Executive the Framers had crafted and\nrecreate the Parliamentary system they had expressly rejected. Circumscribing\nthe impeachment power to reach only existing, defined offenses guarded against\nsuch misuse of the authority.<\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n<ul>\n<li>Alexander Hamilton\u2019s description in Federalist No. 65 does not support House Democrats\u2019 theory of a vague abuse-of-power offense. In an often-cited passage, Hamilton observed that the subjects of impeachment are \u201coffenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust.\u201d <span style=\"color: #000000;\"><a style=\"color: #000000;\" href=\"https:\/\/avalon.law.yale.edu\/18th_century\/fed65.asp\"><strong><em>The Federalist<\/em> 65<\/strong><\/a><\/span>. Hamilton was merely noting fundamental characteristics common to impeachable offenses\u2014that they involve (or \u201cproceed from\u201d) misconduct in public office or abuse of public trust. He was no more saying that \u201cabuse or violation of some public trust\u201d provided, in itself, the definition of a chargeable offense than he was saying that \u201cmisconduct of public men\u201d provided such a definition.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n<ul><li>As Luther Martin, who had been a delegate at the\nConstitutional Convention, summarized the point at the impeachment trial of\nJustice Samuel Chase in 1804, \u201c[a]dmit that the House of Representatives have a\nright to impeach for acts which are not contrary to law, and that thereon the\nSenate may convict and the officer be removed, you leave your judges and all\nyour other officers at the mercy of the prevailing party.\u201d The Framers\nprevented that dangerous result by limiting impeachment to defined offenses\nunder the law.<\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n<ul>\n<li>There is no reason to think that the Framers designed a mechanism for the profoundly disruptive act of impeaching the President that could be accomplished through any unfair and arbitrary means that the House might invent. Impeachment is not just a political process unconstrained by law. \u201cThe subjects of [an impeachment trial] are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust\u201d\u2014that is, \u201cPOLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself.\u201d <span style=\"color: #000000;\"><a style=\"color: #000000;\" href=\"https:\/\/avalon.law.yale.edu\/18th_century\/fed65.asp\"><strong><em>The Federalist<\/em> 65<\/strong><\/a><\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>But \u201cHamilton didn\u2019t say the process of impeachment is entirely political. He said the offense has to be political.\u201d <strong><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><a style=\"color: #000000;\" href=\"https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/articles\/hamilton-wouldnt-impeach-trump-11570661260\">Alan M. Dershowitz, Hamilton Wouldn\u2019t Impeach Trump, Wall St. J. (Oct. 9, 2019)<\/a><\/span><\/strong>. \u201cHamilton\u2019s description in Federalist 65 should not be taken to mean that impeachments have a conventional political nature, unmoored from traditional criminal process.\u201d J. Richard Broughton, Conviction, Nullification, and the Limits of Impeachment As Politics, 68 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 275, 288 (2017).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>Hamilton emphasized that impeachment and removal of \u201cthe accused\u201d must be based on partially legal considerations involving \u201creal demonstrations of innocence or guilt\u201d rather than purely political factors like \u201cthe comparative strength of parties.\u201d <span style=\"color: #000000;\"><a style=\"color: #000000;\" href=\"https:\/\/avalon.law.yale.edu\/18th_century\/fed65.asp\"><strong><em>The Federalist<\/em> 65<\/strong><\/a><\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>It would be incompatible with the Framers\u2019 understanding of the \u201cdelicacy and magnitude of a trust which so deeply concerns the political reputation and existence of every man engaged in the administration of public affairs\u201d to think that they envisioned a system in which the House was free to devise any arbitrary or unfair mechanism it wished for impeaching individuals. <strong><span style=\"color: #000000;\"><a style=\"color: #000000;\" href=\"https:\/\/avalon.law.yale.edu\/18th_century\/fed65.asp\"><em>The Federalist<\/em> 65<\/a><\/span>.<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>The Framers intended the impeachment power to be limited to \u201cguard[] against the danger of persecution, from the prevalency of a factious spirit.\u201d <span style=\"color: #000000;\"><a style=\"color: #000000;\" href=\"https:\/\/avalon.law.yale.edu\/18th_century\/fed66.asp\"><strong><em>The Federalist<\/em> 66<\/strong><\/a><\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>The Framers foresaw clearly the possibility of such an improper, partisan use of impeachment. As Hamilton recognized, impeachment could be a powerful tool in the hands of determined \u201cpre-existing factions.\u201d <span style=\"color: #000000;\"><a style=\"color: #000000;\" href=\"https:\/\/avalon.law.yale.edu\/18th_century\/fed65.asp\"><strong><em>The Federalist<\/em> 65<\/strong><\/a><\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>The Framers fully recognized that \u201cthe persecution of an intemperate or designing majority in the House of Representatives\u201d was a real danger. That is why they chose the Senate as the tribunal for trying impeachments. Further removed from the politics of the day than the House, they believed the Senate could mitigate the \u201cdanger that the decision\u201d to remove a President would be based on the \u201ccomparative strength of parties\u201d rather \u201cthan by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.\u201d <span style=\"color: #000000;\"><a style=\"color: #000000;\" href=\"https:\/\/avalon.law.yale.edu\/18th_century\/fed65.asp\"><strong><em>The Federalist<\/em> 65<\/strong><\/a><\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>The Senate would thus \u201cguard[] against the danger of persecution, from the prevalency of a factious spirit\u201d in the House. <span style=\"color: #000000;\"><a style=\"color: #000000;\" href=\"https:\/\/avalon.law.yale.edu\/18th_century\/fed66.asp\"><strong><em>The Federalist<\/em> 66<\/strong><\/a><\/span> (Alexander Hamilton). It now falls to the Senate to fulfill the role of guardian that the Framers envisioned and to reject these wholly insubstantial Articles of Impeachment that have been propelled forward by nothing other than partisan enmity toward the President.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<ul>\n<li>These Articles reflect nothing more than the \u201cpersecution of an intemperate or designing majority in the House of Representatives\u201d that the Framers warned against. <span style=\"color: #000000;\"><a style=\"color: #000000;\" href=\"https:\/\/avalon.law.yale.edu\/18th_century\/fed65.asp\"><strong><em>The Federalist<\/em> 65<\/strong><\/a><\/span>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n<p><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This post is a continuation of a discussion of the framers, the Constitution, and the impeachment trial of President Donald&hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[1],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7672"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7672"}],"version-history":[{"count":11,"href":"https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7672\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":8248,"href":"https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7672\/revisions\/8248"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7672"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7672"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.statutesandstories.com\/blog_html\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7672"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}